Free Agents, Kevin J. Mitchell. Princeton University Press (ISBN: 9780691226231) 2023.

Summary: An argument based on the evidence of the development of nervous systems, for the evolution of individual agency–free will.

Philosophers have long debated whether human beings have free will or are creatures determined by the various forces that impinge upon us. Then enter the neurobiologists who have been able to increasingly map the fine structures and neural networks of the brain. They have accounted for a vast array of animal and human behaviors For many in the field, they have concluded that ultimately, we only have the illusion of free will. We only think we are thinking and deciding.

Kevin J. Mitchell, while accepting the evidence of evolutionary neurobiology, argues otherwise. He believes there is evidence that human beings, and perhaps other species, have agency that is not an illusion but an evolved quality. There are at least two strands to his argument. First, he traces evolutionary history from single-celled organisms to human beings. The simplest organisms have sensory abilities oriented toward sustaining life (seeking nutrients) and avoiding harm (from poison to predators). Over several chapters he shows how, as multicellular organisms developed, giving way to more complex species, that sensory apparatus developed. Neural inputs fed into ganglia, and eventually a cerebral cortex. Increasingly complicated responses developed to the variety of inputs involving layered and connected neural networks. In human beings, this resulted in a large pre-frontal cortex with semantic capabilities carrying the possibilities of thought and meaning within the recursive and layered neural processes.

The other part of Mitchell’s argument is based on quantum effects and neural “noise” factors that introduce indeterminacy into the system. He argues that this creates room for choice in what might otherwise be a determined system. Combined with human evolution, this allows space for higher level thinking, consciousness of self, and real agency.

He also argues against an approach to freedom as a lack of prior influences on choice. He argues that we have greater freedom when we have access to these factors and can draw upon them. This means we enjoy degrees of free agency rather than some impossible “absolute freedom.”

Until reading Mitchell’s book, I thought there were only two major options. One is dualism which posits a non-material mind, consciousness, or soul interacting with the brain. The other is reductive materialism where we are our brains and agency is illusion. What Mitchell posits is a third option, cognitive realism, in which neural patterns comprising “thoughts” may have causal power based on what they “mean.”

As interesting as this is, I still can see this collapsing into reductive materialism. All of what he posits is rooted in material processes. All material is subject to quantum indeterminacy. Random probability is different from free agency.

Mitchell is still making a materialistic argument. While I recognize that philosophic dualism has its own challenges, not least that it is incapable of scientific proof, I found that Mitchell was dismissive of this long tradition of thought that has its own explanatory power in terms of what it means to be human. Mitchell relegates this to “the ghost in the machine” language, and in doing so thinks he has satisfactorily dismissed it. Yet I wonder if he has substituted material for non-material “ghosts.”

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Disclosure of Material Connection: I received a complimentary copy of this book from the publisher for review.