The Rediscovery of the Mind
The Rediscovery of the Mind. John R. Searle. MIT Press (ISBN: 9780262691543) 1992.
Summary: Argues for consciousness opposing dualism, materialism, and cognitive science, proposing biological naturalism.
I recall a debate between Christian and atheist philosophers in which the atheist made a telling admission. He suggested that the problem of consciousness and how to explain it as a materialist atheist was one of the most vexing philosophical problems. John R. Searle would contend that some have dealt with consciousness and “the mind” by simply eliminating these realities altogether. In this book, he argues for the “rediscovery” of mind and consciousness.
In the early chapters of this book, Searle argues against both dualism, which he argues is incoherent and against reductive materialism in its various flavors. Specifically, he offers critiques of behaviorism, type identity theories, token-token identity theories, black box functionalism and strong artificial intelligence. This last is especially relevant and may need revisiting as AI has advanced to the point where even some of its developers wonder whether it is conscious. However, Searle’s rejection of computational models to account for consciousness leads him to reject the whole enterprise of cognitive science.
What Searle argues for instead is what he calls biological naturalism. He argues that consciousness is a higher level biological process dependent upon more basic and observable substrates of neurochemical processes. However, consciousness is not objectively observable, having a “first person ontology.”
Perhaps one of the most fascinating parts of the book is his discussion of the interaction of conscious and unconscious processes. What happens to our beliefs when we are asleep? How do we understand the content of dreams? And what is the role of intentionality in all of this? He also, contra Chomsky, argues against unconscious syntactic rules for understanding the world.
All in all, it is a fascinating discussion but I concluded that Searle wanted to eat his cake and have it too. He wants to rescue consciousness from both dualists and reductive materialists. He does this by arguing for consciousness as a higher level, yet still a biologically based process. Hence, it is not directly accessible to study. This sounds a bit like dualism. It seems to me like a bit of a halfway house solution. Like halfway houses, one must either go back or go on.
That said, his discussion of materialist accounts of the mind was worth the price of admission. And I think it is helpful to question whether we are locked into a false dichotomy in discussing dualism versus materialism and I see his effort as one seeking to transcend it. I just don’t think he has.
